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Tounderstand the executive demands of the false-belief (FB) task relative to an alternative
theory-of-mind (ormechanical causality) task, picture sequencing, the present study used
path analyses. One hundred and sixty-six children between 3 and 6 years old completed
the FB and picture-sequencing tasks, three executive function tasks (updating, inhibition,
and shifting), and the receptive language test. Themodel with the best fit indicated that FB
performance had a direct contribution from shifting of attention and inhibitory control,
which was independent of the significant contribution made by picture sequencing. This
model indicates that FB inference requires more executive processing than picture
sequencing, which is used as an alternative task to measure theory of mind.
Statement of contribution
What is already known on this subject?
 The majority of researchers use the false-belief task to assess mentalizing ability in young children.
 Sources of information used in various different mentalizing tasks require different levels of
cognitive demand.
 Many executive functions (EFs) are involved in children’s judgements of false belief.
What does this study add?
 A statistical model was created to compare processing requirements of false-belief and picture-
sequencing tasks.
 The model supported the claim that the false-belief task involves considerably more than just
mentalizing.
 Shifting the focus of attentionwas an EF thatwas found to be a key component of performance in the
false-belief task.
Theory of mind (ToM) is a framework used to illuminate children’s developing ability to
impute inner states, principallymental states, to other people. Themost commonmethod
used to investigate development in this arena employs a test of false belief (Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001). A long-standing debate has surrounded how best to explain
children’s developing ability to pass a test of false belief (FB), such as the unexpected
transfer test in which child participants are asked to predict where a protagonist will
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search for a coveted object (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). If children predict that the
protagonist, who is unaware of the relocation of the object, will look in the place she or he
last saw that object, they are credited with an understanding of FB in that they apparently
individuate between what they know is true (the object is in Location A) and what they
think the protagonist believes is true (she or he falsely believes the object is in Location B).
Some researchers argued that development is driven by children acquiring a concept of
belief at about 4 years of age (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman et al.,
2001). In contrast, some researchers argued that children already possess a concept of
belief by 4 years of age but still give the ‘wrong answer’ in an unexpected transfer test due
to various task demands apart from those relevant to having a concept of belief (Lewis &
Osborne, 1990; Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991;
Siegal & Beattie, 1991). Specifically, Russell et al. were the first to suggest that young
childrenmight err not because they have difficultywith the concept of belief but primarily
because of the executive demands of the unexpected transfer test. In agreement, Leslie
and Thaiss (1992) suggested that developing an ability to pass an unexpected transfer test
depends on maturation of the executive processes that the task draws upon.
BloomandGerman (2000)went as far as suggesting that the unexpected transfer test is
not fit for the purpose of investigating development of a ‘theory ofmind’; at the very least,
they suggested a priority is to understand what kind of demands are imposed by the
unexpected transfer test. The purpose of the current researchwas to begin to address this
question by testing children on a variety of tests of executive processing in addition to an
unexpected transfer test. The aimwas to generate a statistical model that would optimally
explain variance in performance data associated with the unexpected transfer test and an
alternativemeasure that also putatively taps into the child’s understanding of others’ inner
states.
A framework for analysing mentalizing tasks
Tounderstand the cognitive demands of the FB task, defining sources of information that a
participant processes during the task is important. Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, and
Monetta (2013) outlined the eight sources of information framework (8-SIF) to
characterize tasks that are currently available for a mentalizing judgement. According to
the framework, mentalizing tasks can involve information for agents and for contexts.
Both types of information can be drawn immediately from a given task or from a person’s
memory, or from both. The immediate information for the agent and for the context can
be presented by perceptual and linguistic means. The information drawn from a person’s
memory of the agent and of the context includes specific or general information. Specific
information includes thedetails that theparticipants already knowabout theprotagonist’s
characteristics as well as the surrounding environment related to the task, whereas
general information refers to general knowledge about people and contexts, which the
participants can recall and use spontaneously. Achim et al. suggest that these sources of
information could contribute to, and influence, the accuracy of mentalizing judgements.
False-belief task and picture-sequencing task
A classic FB task involves a verbal presentation of a scenario with a puppet enactment in
which a protagonist comes to hold a FB about the location of an object due to the
unexpected transfer of that object. In this task, participants are required to process the
perceptual and linguistic information in the story (immediate information), and then, they
2 Hiromi Tsuji and Peter Mitchell
need to access social knowledge about what people would normally do in a case of the
unexpected transfer of an object (stored information) to make a correct judgement.
The picture-sequencing task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) is another type of
task intended to assess children’s mentalizing ability (Achim et al., 2013). In this task,
participants are asked to rearrange four snapshots of an event into sequential order such
that it is coherent in relation to an agent’s mental states, including their false beliefs. This
task is a good point of comparison for an unexpected transfer task because it imposes
different processing demandswhile still tapping into the child’s understanding that others
can hold false beliefs. According to the 8-SIF (Achim et al., 2013), these two tasks impose
similar processing demands with one major difference. Both tasks include sources of
information drawn from memory for general assumptions about the agent and for the
context but do not include specific information for the agent or the context. However,
these tasks differ in that uniquely for the FB task, the immediate information for the agent
and for the context is presented using both perceptual and linguistic modalities, whereas
no immediate linguistic information is available for the picture-sequencing task. In
summary, a FB task requires participants to engage in the dual tasks of processing two
different sources of information, which would place extra cognitive load on participants
when processing linguistic information; this extra load is absent from the picture-
sequencing task.
When characterizingmentalizing based on the 8-SIF, it becomes clear that tackling a FB
task requires processing two sources of information simultaneously. Thus to make a
correct mentalizing judgement in a FB task, children would need to have sufficient
executive processing capacity. Even adults are reported to find the cognitive load
challenging in a FB task. In their study of implicit FB processing, Schneider, Lam, Bayliss,
and Dux (2012) found that adult participants whowere subject to the dual-task condition
failed to track the false location based on a protagonist’s FB, whereas those who were
under the no-load condition correctly tracked the false location. This result suggests that
mentalizing at the implicit level is also disrupted when extra cognitive load associated
with an unexpected transfer test is applied.
Relationship between executive functions and false belief
To cope with the cognitive load in the context of unexpected transfer, certain levels of
executive processes may be required. Development of executive functions (EFs) has
becomeone of the foci in the discussion of howchildren acquire their capacity to exercise
mentalizing judgements in the FB task. EFs encompass a wide range of abilities such as
monitoring and updating of working memory (updating), inhibitory control of prepotent
responses (inhibition), and cognitive flexibility in shifting mental sets (shifting) (Miyake
et al., 2000), and provide the foundation for reflective thinking, reasoning, and self-
control of behaviours (Blair, 2016; Zelazo et al., 2013). These three components are
commonly recognized as distinct functions that are assumed to contribute differently to
more complex cognitive processing tasks (Miyake et al., 2000), perhaps depending on
the degree to which higher order rules are involved. Indeed, some researchers argue that
certain EF and ToM tasks are united by drawing upon such higher order rules (Riggs,
Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998), as articulated in Zelazo et al.’s (2013) ‘Cognitive
Complexity and Control’ theory.
The dissociation of EF components remains inconclusive in developmental studies,
especially for preschool children (Best&Miller, 2010; van derVen,Kroesbergen, Boom,&
Leseman, 2013). Most studies that have examined the role of executive processes in
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mentalizing used some but not all of the components of EFs tomeasure this capacity. This
may have led to lack of clarity over the form of any causal relationships between EFs and
ToM in that EFs were handled sometimes as a single component and sometimes as
separate elements in the statistical analyses. The present study assumes all three
components are important factors in executive processing in mentalizing tasks. If each
component had a unique association with mentalizing, it would provide support for the
three-component structure of EFs in preschool children and bring new insights to the
understanding of developmental trajectories for these components (Best & Miller, 2010).
The findings from a meta-analysis suggest a weak to moderate association between
executive processing capacity and FB judgement across different cultural contexts
(Devine & Hughes, 2014). Devine and Hughes (2014) support a hybrid emergence–
expression hypothesis, which is derived from both the emergence account that EFs play a
functional role in the conceptual development of FB judgement (Russell, 1996) and the
expression account that FB tasks place incidental demands on EFs (Russell et al., 1991).
Devine and Hughes concluded that early developmental variations predict later variations
in FB judgement. The expression account assumes that if mentalizing tasks that place less
executive demands on EFs were used, then the correlations between such mentalizing
tasks and EFs would be reduced in comparison with the original FB task. In an effort to
remove pure incidental task demands in FB judgement, several studies (Carlson, Claxton,
& Moses, 2015; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002) examined the associations between tasks
with fewer executive demands and EFs, and these studies still found associations between
mentalizing tasks and EFs, especially for the component of inhibition, thereby supporting
the emergence account. So far, it has become clear that EFs play a role in the development
of mentalizing in general. However, the exact relationships between these three
components of EFs and different forms of mentalizing tasks have yet to be explored.
When the sources of information are considered in these tasks with fewer executive
demands, irrespective of the degree of conceptual difficulty in tasks, all the tasks require
processing of immediate information conveyed through both a linguistic and a perceptual
channel on the 8-SIF(Achim et al., 2013). In this respect, even conceptually easier tasks
may still require a certain level of executive processing, which led to the identification of
significant relationships between EFs and thesemodified tasks. Thus, it is unclearwhether
these observed relationships are due to common demand derived from conceptual
overlap or cognitive load.
The approach in this study
As argued by Bloom and German (2000), if a FB task is more cognitively demanding than
another mentalizing task such as the picture-sequencing task, then associations between
EFs andmentalizing tasks for the FB andpicture-sequencing taskswill showadifference. It
is possible that the picture-sequencing task may have weak associations with EFs in
comparison with FB tasks. Alternatively, different components of EFs may be associated
with respective mentalizing tasks. To examine these relationships, the present study
conducted path analyses. A recursive model was employed in which a path is only drawn
from picture sequencing to FB according to the assumption that FB is measuring more
thanmentalizing (Bloom&German, 2000). Themagnitude of the direct effects from three
components of EFs (working memory, shifting of attention, and inhibitory control) was
examined while controlling variance associated with receptive language and age, as well
as indirect effects from these variables via the picture-sequencing task. We predict that a
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FB task, which requires more cognitive load in processing sources of information, is likely
to place more demands on the EFs of inhibitory control than a picture-sequencing task.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and sixty-six children (94 boys) between 3 and 6 years old (Mage = 5.0,
SD = 0.86, range 3.5–6.5) participated in this study. They were from a kindergarten
located in middle to lower-middle class communities located on the outskirts of Osaka
city. Ethical approval was granted by the author’s academic institution, and written
informed consents were obtained from the parents of the participants.
Design and materials
Mentalizing abilities were assessed using picture-sequencing and FB tasks. Executive
functions were assessed using the pointing–Stroop task (Berger, Jones, Rothbart, &
Posner, 2000), the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task (Zelazo, 2006), and the
digit span task. Receptive language was assessed using a Japanese version of the PVT
(Ueno, Nakoshi, & Onuki, 2008). The language measure was used to partial out variance
shared between the focal tasks that were explained by language ability.
Mentalizing tasks
FB tasks
Two unexpected transfer tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner,
1983) in which a puppet protagonist holds a FB about the location of an object were used
to measure theory-of-mind ability. Each task included a memory question for the initial
location of the item, a reality question for the present location of the item and a FB
question for the protagonist’s belief about the location of the item. All three questions had
to be answered correctly for children to be coded as passing the task.
Picture-sequencing task
Four pictures, depicting scenes that represented an event involving causality or mental
states, were presented to the children. The children were asked to put them in order to
make a story. Four sets of task stimuli were chosen from the picture-sequencing test
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). These included two sets for causality events, a person
causally interacting with an object and an object causally interacting with an object
(mechanical condition), and two sets of stimuli involving the attribution of people’s
mental states for a missing teddy bear and a missing bar of chocolate (intentional
condition). The children’s ability to represent events was assessed based on the correct
sequencing of pictures to make the story. The scoring system used by the original study
was followed.
Executive function tasks
For the three components of EFs, we chose the pointing–Stroop task (Berger et al.,
2000) for inhibitory control, the DCCS task (Zelazo, 2006) for shifting of attention and
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cognitive flexibility, and the digit span task to measure verbal working memory (WM).
These tasks were chosen because they are well established, are reliable, and are
suitable for children as young as 3 years old (Diamond, 2013; van der Ven et al.,
2013; Zelazo, 2006). These tasks only require a simple response of touching one of
the stimuli or repeating the digits. The first two tasks were presented to the
participants on a computer with a touch panel screen. The digit span task was
administered manually.
Pointing–Stroop task
This task was based on Berger et al. (2000) and comprises three blocks, which were
administered in the following order: practice (two trials), compatibility (eight trials),
and incompatibility (eight trials). The trial was started by touching a ‘focal point’ on
the screen, which initiated the display of cat and dog pictures with simultaneous
audio presentations of the animal’s sound ‘meow’/’woof’. The child needed to touch
the picture that was compatible/incompatible with the animal sound she or he heard
(a) Compatibility trial
(b) Incompatibility trial
Figure 1. Trial sequence of stimuli presentation for the audio Stroop task. For the compatibility trials
(a), when the audio stimulus of ‘meow’ is presented, the child needed to touch the cat picture, whereas
when the audio stimulus of ‘woof woof’ is presented, the child needed to touch the dog picture. For the
incompatibility trials (b), when the audio stimulus of ‘meow’ is presented, the child needed to touch the
dog picture, and vice versa.
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(Figure 1). For scoring, the number of correct responses in incompatibility trials was
used.
DCCS task
This task was developed from the original manual presentation of DCCS (Zelazo, 2006).
The children’s correct responses after introducing a new sorting rule were measured. A
block of two practice trials, which was repeated until the child understood the task,
preceded the pre-switch block (six trials) and the post-switch block (six trials). When the
child touched one of the pictures (hat or bag), a sound was made to acknowledge the
action regardless of accuracy. The child initiated the next trial when she or he was ready
by touching the focal point on the screen (Figure 2). For scoring, the number of correct
responses in the post-switch condition was used.
Digit span task
Following the instructions of KABC (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), a series of digits were
presented to the child orally. The child needed to repeat back the digits to the
experimenter in a forward order. The child was awarded one point for each trial in which
the series of digits were repeated back correctly.
Receptive language
A Japanese version of PVT (Ueno et al., 2008) assessed the children’s general receptive
language. In the PVT, the childwas presentedwith four pictures fromwhich they selected
the picture that matched with the language they heard. Adjusted scores, taking into
account the probability of guessing the correct picture, were used.
Procedures
Childrenwere tested individually in a quiet room in one session, which lasted 25–30 min.
The order of the tasks was counterbalanced with the exception of the PVT, which was
always administered last because the duration of this task varies dramatically depending
on the individual’s language ability and this may have had an effect on the child’s
motivation for any subsequent tasks.
Figure 2. Trial sequence for the stimuli presentation of DCCS. In the pre-switch block (e.g., colour
rule), when a blue bag is presented, the child needs to touch the picture of a ‘blue hat’. In the post-switch
block (e.g., shape rule), when a blue bag is presented, the child needs to touch a picture of a ‘red bag’.
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Analytic strategy
Path analysis was used to test the model and the relationships between the measured
variables. Analyses were performed using the statistical package AMOS 21.0. (IBM SPSS,
Chicago, IL, USA)
Specification of the model
A theoretical model specified in the literature (e.g., Bloom&German, 2000) is a recursive
model in which there is a unidirectional relationship from the picture-sequencing task to
FB task, where the FB task requires additional and independent input from EFs. For the
picture-sequencing task, fewer EFs are required; specifically, the ‘shifting’ component is
not needed, as the picture-sequencing task does not require processing of linguistic input
for competing representations of reality and belief.
Identification of the model
To test the specified model using the observed data, both the parameter estimation and
the adequacy of model fit were examined. To test the model for goodness-of-fit, the
following criteria were computed: Chi-squared test (p > .05), comparative fit index
(CFI ≥ .90) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA ≤ .06), and goodness-
of-fit index (GFI > .90) (McDonald & Ho, 2002; Hu & Bentler, 1999). For the parameter
estimates, age and PVT were included in the model regardless of statistical significance
because they were considered as compound variables to be controlled for in explaining
the relationships between EFs and mentalizing.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all the measures are summarized in Table 1. These are tabulated
by age to show developmental trends. There were no gender differences for the tasks,
with the exception of DCCS in which girls scored higher than boys: t (164) = 3.23, two-
tailed p < .001. Cohen’s d = .51. Thus, gender was not considered in subsequent
analyses. For picture-sequencing scores, the correlations between FB and the two types of
picture sequencing (mechanical and intentional) were similar (r = .55 and r = .58,
ps < .001) and there was a significant correlation between the intentionality and
mechanical subdomains (r = .61, p < .001), and intertask item analysis (Table S1) found
no justification for separating these variables of picture sequencing into their component
parts. Thus, these scores were combined to make a single measurement for further
analyses. The skewness of all themeasureswas below1.5, and the kurtosiswas below2.0.
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measurements are summarized in
Table 2. All the variables interrelated positively with a moderate to strong degree of
association.
To examine how performance measured by the FB and the picture-sequencing tasks
was related to EFs, path analyses using AMOSwithmaximum-likelihood estimation1 were
conducted following Analytic strategy described in Method section. A total score for the
FB and the picture-sequencing tasks was, respectively, set as endogenous variables in a
1Univariate distributions were within the recommended ranges for skewness<2 and kurtosis<7 (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995).
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recursive path model with a path from the picture-sequencing task to the FB task while
WM, Stroop, DCCS, receptive language, and age were set as exogenous variables.
From the theoretical model specified in Analytic strategy section, the initial model
which excluded a path fromDCCS (shifting component of EFs) to the picture-sequencing
task was tested. In this model, the parameters in the paths from WM to both the picture-
sequencing task (b = .066, p = .33) and FB task (b = .007, p = .92)were found to be non-
significant. The model fit index was deemed to be sufficient: v2(1) = .72, p = .40,
CFI = 1.00, AGFI = .97, RMSEA < .0001, 90% CIs [0.00, 0.19], AIC = 54.72.
Another model excluding the non-significant paths from WM to picture sequencing
and FB was considered next. This model indicated good fit with goodness-of-fit statistics:
v2(3) = 1.95, p = .58, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = .97, RMSEA < .0001, 90% CIs [0.00, 0.11],
Table 1. Descriptive statistics tabulated by age
Age groups
3-year
n = 30
4-year
n = 47
5-year
n = 54
6-year
n = 35
Total
n = 166 Reliability
Age (42–78 months) M 45.60 54.70 64.89 74.63 60.57 –
SD 1.54 3.65 3.29 2.02 10.35
Picture sequencing (0–8) M 2.33 3.85 6.00 7.20 4.98 .79a
SD 1.73 2.74 2.34 1.57 2.81
Executive functions
Stroop (0–8) M 4.17 5.83 7.07 7.54 6.30 .90b
SD 3.30 2.88 2.04 1.29 2.71
DCCS (0–6) M 2.67 3.60 4.91 5.23 4.20 .89b
SD 2.50 2.40 1.78 1.61 2.28
WM (0–15) M 7.83 7.85 9.37 10.06 8.81 .77c
SD 2.39 2.21 2.31 1.53 2.33
FB (0–2) M 0.17 0.94 1.44 1.66 1.11 .86a
SD 0.53 0.89 0.82 0.73 0.93
PVT (3–60) M 12.40 16.15 23.81 31.09 21.11 –
SD 7.87 7.21 10.38 10.71 11.31
Notes. Measurement ranges are indicated in parenthesis.
aReliability was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha.
bThe split-half reliability was calculated using the Spearman–Brown prophecy coefficient.
cReliability was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha, which was adjusted by excluding the sets of two- and
seven-digit trials, whose variances were zero.
Table 2. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measurements and age
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Age –
2. PVT .62** –
3. WM .43** .56** –
4. Stroop .45** .49** .37** –
5. DCCS .45** .46** .40** .53** –
6. Picture sequencing .66** .60** .44** .48** .44** –
7. FB .56** .60** .41** .56** .52** .62**
Note. **p < .01 (two-tailed).
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AIC = 51.95. Adding the path from DCCS to the picture-sequencing task (b = .07,
p = .32) did not improve the model: v2(2) = .97, p = .62, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = .98,
RMSEA < .0001, 90% CIs [0.00, 0.13] AIC = 52.97. Therefore, we decided to use the
second model as the final model. The coefficients of parameter estimates are shown in
Figure 3.
For picture-sequencing performance, in addition to age (b = .43) and receptive
language (b = .25), Stroop (b = .17) made a significant contribution, explaining 51% of
the variance. This picture-sequencing task (b = .28)made a significant contribution to FB,
with additional unique and significant contributions from receptive language (b = .19),
Stroop (b = .21), and DCCS (b = .15), explaining a total of 54% of variance in FB. When
the picture-sequencing scores for only the intentional trials were used, then similar
parameter estimates were obtained, though the estimate of FB from age was approaching
significance (b = .15, p = .053), indicating good fit: v2(3) = 1.94, p = .59, AGFI = .97,
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .0001, AIC = 51.94.
Discussion
The present study tested amodel inwhich the FB task ismore cognitively demanding than
the picture-sequencing task, allowing us to examine their associations with the three EF
components. In this model, age, receptive language, and Stroop (inhibition) were
significant contributors to the picture-sequencing task, explaining 51% of variance.
However, DCCS (shifting) and WM (updating) did not make significant contributions to
thepicture-sequencing task. Thepicture-sequencing task subsequently contributed to the
FB task, with independent contributions from EFs (Stroop and DCCS), age, and receptive
language, accounting for 54% of the variance. These results suggest that FB performance
could be explained by additional unique variance in DCCS and Stroop in addition to the
Figure 3. The final path model with FB and picture sequencing as endogenous variables and EFs,
language, and age as exogenous variables.
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picture-sequencing task; this supports the claim by Bloom and German (2000) that the FB
task measures more than just mentalizing ability. Another way of interpreting the data
would be that the FB task more strongly draws upon executive processes than does the
picture-sequencing task.
For the EFs, the DCCS task was used to measure the flexible shifting of the focus of
attention, whereas the Stroop task was used to measure inhibitory control. Additional
variance in both inhibitory control and shifting of the focus of attention was needed to
pass the FB task, suggesting that these two functions appeared to be key elements that are
required to pass the FB task. Although the flexible shifting of the focus of attention as
measured by theDCCS task seems to be critical for passing the FB task, it is not essential for
the picture-sequencing task. In contrast, inhibitory control as measured by the pointing–
Stroop task appeared to contribute to both tasks. Thus, some forms of inhibitory control
are likely to be involved in responding to the general executive demands of both tasks.
This interpretation accords with the claim that relationships between theory-of-mind and
EF tasks are attributable to more than just a common problem of inhibitory control and
that different aspects of EFs are needed to explain their developmental relationships
(Perner et al., 2002). In the present study, Stroop and DCCS were administered using a
touch-screen PC. Therefore, it is unlikely that differential effects of Stroop and DCCS on
the FB and picture-sequencing tasks derived from any procedural differences.
The results also highlight that shifting ability as measured by DCCS is not associated
with the picture-sequencing task but is associated with the FB task. It is possible to
interpret this finding from the EFs requiredby each task. Themental set shifting in this task
is also considered as cognitive flexibility, which incorporates an ability to change
perspectives (Diamond, 2013). The FB tasks involve two competing representations of
the child’s and the protagonist’s knowledge. To pass the task, children need to keep track
of these representations and then inhibit their own representation to enable an attentional
shift to the protagonist’s representation. However, to pass the picture-sequencing task,
which has no competing representations, the children just need to arrange the events in
order while inhibiting a desire to jump straight to the concluding picture. This
interpretation resonates with the argument from the cognitive complexity control theory
(David Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 2002), in that the higher order rules which are
common to FB and DCCS can explain the association between EFs and FB, and therefore,
the picture-sequencing task does not make as high demands as the FB task.
With respect to the 8-SIF (Achim et al., 2013), the FB task includes additional linguistic
sources of information for the agent and for the context. Extra linguistic information
included in the FB task may be helpful in guiding the participants to impute the agent’s
mental states. However, this source of information could come at a cost because of the
linguistic information about the changes in the context resulting from a translocation of
the object. It could inadvertently direct the participants’ attention to themore salient (the
true belief) location rather than the agent’s (false) belief, without a volitional flexible shift
of attention. Thus, the participantsmay require an important shift in the focus of attention
from the context they hear last. Unique variance in inhibitory control and shift of attention
that help explain the FB scores in the model support this interpretation.
These findings suggest that passing the FB task demands both inhibitory control to
suppress prepotent information and cognitive flexibility to shift one’s perspective to a
different one. For this reason, compared with the picture-sequencing task, passing the FB
task places demands on awider range of EFs. The present findings also highlight the value
of considering three components of EFs because the mentalizing tasks are indeed
interwoven with different components of executive processing to different degrees. To
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address the relationships between mentalizing ability and EFs, an analytical framework is
needed to better understand the nature of the task especially to clarify the extent towhich
certain tasks impose executive demands.
Is it possible that the extra linguistic information given in the FB task could cause the
participants to incorrectly impute themental states of the agent?When the FB task is given
without a verbal scenario to young children (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), they
performed well. In such a non-verbal FB task, the participants do not need to process
linguistic information and therefore do not need to make an effortful shift in the focus of
attention that may be required in the verbal FB task. Under such circumstances, the
younger children were imputing the agent’s mental state without interference from
linguistic information. When verbal processing is involved, however, the linguistic
representation could make it harder for the participants to shift their focus of attention to
the original (falsely believed) location. Previous findings from adult participants whose
implicit FB inferences were negatively affected by just listening to unrelated linguistic
information (Schneider et al., 2012) raise the possibility that even a low-level cognitive
load could degrade a participants’ performance.
The emergingpicture for the FB task has important implications for the interpretation of
existing studies in regard to the development ofmentalizing. EFs seem to play a critical role
when mentalizing ability is measured using FB tasks, whereas EFs may be less important in
processing other mentalizing tasks such as the picture-sequencing task. This notion
becomes crucial when the expression–emergence hypothesis is discussed because many
studies are based on the relational findings between mentalizing and EFs. More precisely,
the source of information included in mentalizing seems to account for the possibility of
finding a relationship between EFs and ToM. Carlson et al. (2015) found that including or
excluding the aspect of FB did not change their relationships with EFs. Although cognitive
loadwasmanipulated, the tasksCarlson et al.used includedboth linguistic information and
perceptual information, and are similar to each other based on the 8-SIF (Achim et al.,
2013). This seems to suggest that analyses of the tasks in terms of the sources of information
are important when making a relevant selection of mentalizing tasks.
In the selection of mentalizing tasks, researchers might also like to take into account
the relative degree of demands placed by EFs, which emerged from the present
comparison between FB and picture-sequencing tasks. Bloom andGerman (2000) suggest
that the FB task can be used to explore the relative difficulty of reasoning representations.
The present findings extend this further by enabling researchers to investigate which of
the fundamental cognitive processes of EFs are in place. If children pass the FB task, then
they are likely to have a wider range of EFs such as inhibitory control and cognitive
flexibility than those who only pass the picture-sequencing task. Children who pass the
picture-sequencing task, but not the FB task, are likely to havementalizing ability, but not
the full range of EFs needed to reason about mental representations in the more
challenging format of the FB task.
This argument resonates with the present finding of a close association between the
intentional and mechanical versions of the picture-sequencing task. From the original
study (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986), intentional and causality versions of the picture-
sequencing task were expected to elicit different results. However, the present study
found that such differences in the contents (intentional/mechanical) may be very subtle
when compared with the robustness of the executive processing required by the
characteristics of the picture-sequencing task. Processing the sources of information in
the picture-sequencing task is similar for intentional and mechanical versions, and
differences in content had little impact on performance. Modelling executive
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components in this present study has elucidated how different mentalizing tasks create
differing executive demands. More generally, the results probably lean in favour of the
expression account over the emergence account concerning how the development of EF
relates to the development of ToM:While children’s ability on the FB task suggests a level
of performance that is constrained by limitations in executive abilities, this was not so
apparent for the picture sequence task. This finding raises the possibility that the FB task
imposes executive demands that prevent children from expressing their ability to
mentalize.
Conclusion
The FB task has been used in a large number of studies that investigate the development of
ToM, and has almost become a signature task for the measurement of this ability.
However, the path analyses in this study found that passing the FB task requires
considerably more than just mentalizing ability, as claimed by Bloom and German (2000).
Assessing the development of mentalizing abilities with a variety of mentalizing tasks,
giving due consideration to the source of information, could provide a better approach to
understanding the development of this ability.
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